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| THE TRAGIC BLUNDER
IN KOSOVO |
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| For Globe
and Mail, January 10, 2000. |
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| The bombing of
Yugoslavia in the closing days of the 20th century has
raised disturbing and unresolved issues about
international security that must be addressed. Hailed as a
victory for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the
bombing, on closer analysis, can be seen as an unmitigated
failure with far-reaching implications for world peace.
Canada must demand more of its political leaders before
they lead us into another war. |
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| Canada's
participation in this undeclared war against a sovereign state
was carried out without public awareness or debate in
Parliament. The bombing was conducted without the approval of
the United Nations Security Council and was a direct violation
not only of the UN Charter but also of Article 1 of the NATO
Treaty itself, which requires NATO to settle any international
dispute by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or
use of force, "in any manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations." |
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| Foreign Minister
Lloyd Axworthy and Defence Minister Art Eggleton have assured
us this flagrant violation of international law was necessary
to stop ethnic cleansing and human-rights violations against
the Albanian population of Kosovo. |
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| Six
months have passed since the end of the bombing. Now the war
is over, it's time for sober analysis about why it was fought.
The public has been bombarded with NATO propaganda, not only
about the reasons for the intervention but also about its
results. I believe we have been subject to duplicity and
misleading information. The first casualty of the war in
Kosovo has been the truth. |
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| Our
political leaders and much of the media have said that the
bombing of Yugoslavia was launched to stop ethnic cleansing
and atrocities. This is a myth. All the evidence shows that
there were approximately 2,000 casualties in Kosovo up to the
time of the NATO bombing -- by any standard, not an
extraordinary number considering that a civil war had been
raging since 1993. By contrast, the number of Yugoslavian civilians killed
by the NATO bombing is reckoned to be well above 2,000. |
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| The UN
estimated that close to 200,000 ethnic Albanians were
displaced before the NATO air strikes -- again, a deplorable
figure but not surprising given that these people were driven
from their homes as a result of the civil war. After the NATO
bombs began to fall, more than 800,000 Kosovars were forced to
flee from Serbian retaliation and from NATO bombs. So much for
humanitarian intervention. |
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| Following a UN resolution,
the Yugoslav government in November, 1998, allowed 1,300
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
observers into Kosovo in an attempt to monitor and
de-escalate the fighting. As far as I know the official
OSCE report was never published. Had it been, we could verify the allegations that ethnic cleansing and
atrocities were serious enough to warrant military
intervention. The failure to publish the report strongly
suggests that the alleged repression in Kosovo did not
justify intervention. |
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| Moreover, a number
of credible OSCE observers have publicly stated that in the
weeks leading up to the bombing they witnessed no murders, no
deportations and nothing that could be described as systematic
persecution. One of these observers, the former Czech foreign
minister, Jiri Dienstbier, has further testified that NATO was fully aware that bombing
would force the Serbs to expel Kosovar Albanians as a military
tactic. Yet our political leaders continue to tell us the
bombing was designed to prevent -- not cause -- ethnic
cleansing. |
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| The
immediate reason for the air strike was the Serbian refusal to
sign the infamous Rambouillet Agreement -- a 57-page document
that called for a referendum on autonomy in Kosovo and
provided access to NATO forces to all of Yugoslavia. No
sovereign state could possibly have accepted such conditions.
This document was not made public until well after the bombing
was under way. The chairman of the French National Assembly's
defence committee did not receive a copy until June 3, after
the Serbs had already accepted the terms of the ceasefire! I
doubt any Canadian member of Parliament has bothered to
request a copy. In any case, the Rambouillet document, drafted
by the Americans, was clearly designed to ensure a Serb
rejection. NATO needed its war. |
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| The
bombing began on March 25, 1999. NATO expected Yugoslavia to
capitulate in a matter of days. When this did not happen and
the bombing was extended to more and more civilian targets,
public support in some NATO countries began to wane. The
alliance found itself in trouble: None of its objectives had
been achieved and the bombing was creating a humanitarian
catastrophe and pulverizing a modern European state. |
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| A negotiated
settlement was essential. But NATO had to save face. Although
it had in effect excluded the Russians through the insulting
terms of Rambouillet, the alliance now turned to Moscow to get
it out of the jam it found itself in. Former Russian prime
minister Victor Chernomydrin persuaded NATO to drop the two
most objectionable conditions, the referendum and access for
NATO troops to Yugoslavia. NATO made further concessions
--acknowledging Yugoslav sovereignty over Kosovo, putting the
occupation of Kosovo under UN auspices, and letting Yugoslav
troops guard Serbian holy sites. |
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| The UN
approved the terms of this peace agreement; it remains to be
seen if NATO will honour them. My guess is, having made a mess
of the war, NATO will make a mess of the peace. Already,
NATO's supreme commander in Europe, U.S. General Wesley Clark,
has warned that NATO will prevent any attempt by Yugoslavia to
return troops to Kosovo. One can hardly read this as a sign of
NATO's respect for the UN. |
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| The
bombing of Yugoslavia was a tragic mistake. There have been
dreadful human and financial costs. Ethnic cleansing and
murder continue in Kosovo. More seriously, NATO's illegal
action has fractured the framework of world security that has
existed since the end of the Second World War. It has
destabilized the Balkans and alienated the other great nuclear
powers, Russia and China. NATO has abandoned the rule of law
and lost any moral stature it might have had during the Cold
War years. By forsaking diplomacy and resorting to force, NATO
has reduced the democratic countries of the West to the level
of the dictatorships it was created to oppose. |
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| Canada's
foreign minister would have us believe Kosovo marked a turning
point in the way the international community is to react in
future when human-rights violations take place within the
borders of a sovereign state. We are asked to believe that the
long-standing principle of state sovereignty can be overruled
in the interests of humanitarianism intervention. We are asked
to embrace new concepts of "soft power" and
"human security." Mr. Axworthy assures us that
Canada will always make its own foreign-policy decisions
independently. |
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| Yet when great
issues were at stake in Kosovo -- issues of life or death, of
war or peace, of ignoring the UN Security Council, of
violating NATO's own treaty -- Canada's voice was not heard.
We eagerly joined the war without question and without
consultation with the representatives of the Canadian people. |
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| It
didn't have to be this way. Another Canadian foreign minister
faced a similar decision back in 1956. In the early days of
the Suez crisis, Lester Pearson came out against the bombing
of the Suez Canal by Canada's French and British allies and
played a key role in getting the UN to halt the invasion. |
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| If
Canada is to play an effective role in international affairs
it must continue to stand for the rule of law, for the UN
charter and for democratic decision-making when its military
could become involved in aggressive action against sovereign
states. |
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If Mr. Axworthy is serious
about pushing a human security agenda, let him demand that
NATO reaffirm its adherence to the UN Charter and its
commitment not to resolve international disputes by the
threat or use of force. This simple reaffirmation would
reassure Canadians that
as we enter the new millennium we all know that the ground
rules have not changed. |
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If you want to download this article - "The
Tragic Blunder In Kosovo" in PDF (182KB) format click
here |
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