|
|
|
|
|
|
TWO HUNDRED YEARS LATER
(part 2) |
|
Sometimes the intervention by the great
powers in Serbian affairs has been beneficial, but more
often intervention has spelled tragedy and despair for the
Serbia people. Above all the involvement of the great
powers has never been motivated by concern for Serbian
interests but only for the benefit and interest of the
intervening state. |
|
|
|
|
In the nineteenth
century, Russia was willing to help Serbia in its efforts to win
freedom from Turkish domination but only when it served Russian
interests. During Tito’s regime the United States was
forthcoming with assistance and support but only after Tito’s
break with Stalin. When the Soviet Union self-destructed, United
States interest in Yugoslavia came to a sudden and abrupt halt.
Ironically, it was the end of the Cold War that also hastened
the down fall of the Yugoslav Federation and helped to bring
about the events that subsequently overwhelmed Serbia. |
|
|
|
The dismantling of Marxist
ideology that preceded the break up of the Soviet Union forced
the socialist leaders of Eastern Europe to find other means of
retaining the support of their people. In Yugoslavia the leaders
of the Republics turned to religious and ethnic nationalism.
Moreover, the collapse of the USSR meant that Yugoslavia no
longer enjoyed its privileged position as a buffer between the
world’s two super powers. The United States quickly acted to
remove Yugoslavia from the list of countries eligible for
financial credits. Yugoslavia suddenly found itself in the
position of being just another unimportant Balkan country. It
then became vulnerable to the separatist movements that had been
awaiting their moment to be launched. |
|
|
|
It is too early for
historians to ascertain whether it was inevitable that
Yugoslavia would break apart after the death of Tito and the end
of the Cold War. What can be stated with certainty is that
intervention by the Western democracies played a leading role in
the break up and by their actions guaranteed that the break up
would be accompanied by bloodshed.
Once again outside intervention in Balkan affairs resulted in
disaster and wreckage for the people living there. As if it were
not enough to have endured the Ottoman Turks, the Austrian -
Hungarian Hapsburgs, the German Nazis and then the communists-
the people of Serbia were once again held hostage to the
manipulation by outside powers. Sadly, this time, the powers
were the democratic countries of Western Europe and North
America. |
|
|
|
As the Canadian
Ambassador to Yugoslavia I was a first hand witness to the
events that led to the break up of the nation. I also was a
witness to the duplicity, the lies, the misinformation and
hypocrisy that characterized the behavior of the intervening
powers. This subversion of the truth and hypocrisy continues
today.
There are few people in the United States or Canada who do not
believe that everything that went wrong in Yugoslav was the
responsibility of Slobodan Milosevic and Serbia, that it was
Milosevic’s dream of a ‘Greater Serbia” that started the
violence and the ethnic cleansing. They also believe the lie
that it was Serbian genocide in Kosovo that forced NATO to
intervene in a humanitarian effort to save the Albanian Kosovars. |
|
|
|
These untruths are repeated
almost automatically in the daily media whenever the bombing of
Yugoslavia is mentioned or whenever there is reference to the
Hague war crimes tribunal. Over time lies if repeated often
enough take on the cloak of truth. They become accepted as
unquestionable and those who challenge them are looked upon as
eccentric or as someone who has an axe to grind.
The reality is that Germany and Austria must accept much of the
responsibility for the breakup of Yugoslavia. Germany gave
active encouragement to Croatia to secede and this included the
provision of arms, finances and later active diplomatic support
for recognition. |
|
|
|
But it was the United
States that should be held primarily responsible for the
civil war in Bosnia. It was through the intervention of
the United States that Alija Izetbegovic was persuaded
to renege on the agreement he had signed in Lisbon with
his Serbian and Croatian counterparts that stood a good
chance of preventing the subsequent bloodshed in that
Republic. Again it was the United States that encouraged
and supported the terrorist KLA to use violence and take
up arms in open rebellion in Kosovo. |
|
|
|
|
|
At the beginning of the Yugoslav
breakup, the United States did make a half hearted but belated
diplomatic effort to keep the nation united. When it became
apparent that Germany was determined to force premature
recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, the United States deferred
and chose not to become actively engaged in the dispute. It was,
after all, a European problem to be resolved to be solved by
Europeans.
Nevertheless, as the fighting spread and it became evident that
the European Community was powerless to bring the conflict to a
peaceful end, the United States decided once more to become
engaged in Yugoslavia. A decision was made to intervene in
Bosnia. It was not because the United States was particularly
concerned about the issues on the ground. After all, few
Americans understood the difference between Serb, Croat or
Muslim peoples. Indeed few would have been able to find Bosnia
on a map. |
|
|
|
The reason the Americans
decided to intervene was because they suddenly discovered that
arising out of the Yugoslav turmoil there was an opportunity
of pursuing two short term United States foreign policy
objectives
.
The first of these occasions was the opportunity presented in
Bosnia of displaying to the Islamic world that the United
States was not anti-Muslim. This was particularly important
following the first Iraq war. It was thought that by throwing
US support behind Alija Izetbegovic and promising him US
recognition for Bosnian statehood that US relations with the
Muslim world would be strengthened. Izetbegovic’s dream of
becoming the leader of the first Muslim state in Europe since
the Ottoman Empire was to be realized. |
|
|
|
The certainty that
this policy would cause a civil war in Bosnia and lead to the
death and displacement of many thousands was of little
importance. Similarly, the possibility that in the long term
United States intervention on the Muslim side would create a
potential base for Islamist terrorists in the Balkans was
obviously not considered.
The second opportunity for the United States was offered later
by the deteriorating situation in Kosovo. By intervening on the
side of the Albanians the USA was able to reassert its primacy
over NATO and to revitalize a dormant institution that had lost
its reason for existence after the Warsaw Pact armies had gone
home. |
|
|
|
Like many features of US foreign
policy since the end of the cold war the decisions to intervene
in Bosnia and to back the terrorist KLA in Kosovo and later in
Macedonia have been disastrously wrong headed and strategically
unsound. Curiously, few people in the Western democratic
countries were concerned about the illegal bombing of
Yugoslavia. Even those who acknowledged that the bombing was a
violation of the UN Charter and international law seemed to hold
their noses and suggest that since the intervention prevented
genocide and ethnic cleansing it was justified.
There was nothing like the current out cry over the invasion of
Iraq that was also done without United Nations authority. The
demands to have proof of the existence of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq contrasted sharply with the almost blind
acceptance of allegations of human rights violations in Kosovo.
No one asked for proof of genocide in Kosovo before the bombing
started. When no evidence was found of mass graves in Kosovo
where was the demand for accountability on the part of those who
made those false charges?
|
|
|
|
The Canadian Prime Minister
willingly had Canadian forces participate in the bombing of
Yugoslavia but refused to participate with the USA‘s war in Iraq
on the grounds that it was done without UN approval. Robin
Cooke, the British Foreign Minister, who was an ardent proponent
of the Yugoslav bombing, actually resigned in protest over the
war in Iraq. President George Bush has received scathing
domestic and international criticism over Iraq, yet former
President Clinton was looked upon as a hero for leading the
attack against Yugoslavia.
I would like to be able to say that as a result of all the lies
and misinformation about the breakup of the former Yugoslavia
and about Kosovo that we have learned a lesson. It would be nice
to believe that as a result of Kosovo, our democratic electorate
and media have become more discriminating and more demanding of
our political leaders in matters affecting foreign policy. |
|
|
|
Could it be that the Kosovo experience has
made the leaders of the European Community more skeptical of
United States intelligence reports about weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq? Could this be the underlying reason why
France and Germany did not support the United States war against
Saddam Hussein? Did the Western democracies learn something from
the bitterness of the Yugoslavian debacle? I think not – but I
will leave it to the historians and others to provide the
answers to those questions.
I conclude this presentation not necessarily on a note of
optimism but rather on one of hope. The events of 9-11
confronted the United States with its own mortality. It should
now be obvious to every American that small democratic countries
such as Serbia are not a threat to their existence. That threat
comes from elsewhere. It comes from extremist Islamists and
their ability to smuggle nuclear devices and other weapons of
mass destruction into the United States and cause a horrific
catastrophe - a catastrophe that could spell the end of
civilization as we know it. After 9-11 it has become evident
that so soon after the end of the cold war we all again live in
perilous times. |
|
|
|
|
It is my hope therefore
that in formulating its foreign policy the United States
will realize that awesome military and technological
power does not protect it from suicidal fanatics who are
desperate to fulfill their fantasies of martyrdom.
America must rely on reliable friends and allies who
share a long history of individual freedom and a love of
liberty. In the Balkans that tradition is not to be
found among the Albanians in Kosovo or the Muslims in
Bosnia. It is to be found in Serbia. And it is to found
there because the spirit of the Karadjordje continues to
live in the hearts of the Serbian people. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|