 |
 |
 |
The new diplomacy, it would appear, has been accepted, but has it really----. Now that the war is over and there has been time for some sober after thought, more and more commentators and analysts are beginning to realize that the Kosovo war was an unmitigated disaster. None of the policy objectives claimed by NATO were achieved. |
 |
 |
 |
|
 |
|
In the name of
humanity the NATO bombing caused a humanitarian catastrophe.
Over a million Kosovars were displaced and the subsequent
Serbian retaliation and NATO bombing devastated the region.
Yugoslavia’s infrastructure has been destroyed. The bridges
across the Danube have been blown at inestimable cost, not
only to Serbia, but as well, to the other neighboring
countries. The environmental price tag in the long run will be
measured not only in millions of dollars but in serious human
health and medical disabilities. |
 |
 |
 |
The
claim that by intervening in Kosovo stability in the Balkans
could be secured has also proven to be illusory. The NATO
action has had the opposite effect. Yugoslavia’s neighbours
are in a state of turmoil. Montenegro is on the verge of civil
war. Macedonia is uneasy about its Albanian minority. Albania
has been encouraged to believe that its dream of greater
Albania is not beyond reach. Finally Serbia itself is torn
apart with internal strife and injured pride . The Balkan time
bomb has been given a shorter fuse. All of this has been done
in the name of containment. |
 |
 |
 |
In
diplomacy things are not always what they seem. NATO’s
stated reasons for bombing Yugoslavia had really little to do
with humanitarian factors or concerns about Balkan stability.
There were far more serious humanitarian issues elsewhere in
the world. Stability is not enhanced by waging war. The real
reasons must be found elsewhere. |
 |
 |
 |
The U.S. Led
attack on Yugoslavia was designed to improve president
Clinton’s public image and restore credibility to NATO,
whose existence since the end of the cold war was in jeopardy.
This was the real agenda of the NATO war. In terms of Balkan
history it is an old agenda. |

|
|
 |
 |
 |
Traditionally
western intervention in the Balkans has proven to be
disastrous. From the congress of Berlin to World War and the
Second World War, the western powers have interfered in the
Balkans for their own selfish policy objectives. These aims
have had little relevance to the issues affecting the peoples
of the Balkan countries. What was true of the past has proven
true again in Kosovo. |
 |
 |
 |
Because of the demonic image the
western media had already created of Slobodan Milosevic it was not difficult for him to be blamed for committing outrageous atrocities in Kosovo. In fact prior to the bombing the total casualties in Kosovo, Serb and Albanian, did not reach beyond 2000,which by any standard was not cause for military intervention. Nevertheless, NATO needed its war. |
 |
 |
 |
The immediate cause of the bombing was Yugoslavia’s refusal to sign the Rambouillet agreement. The fact that the Albanian side had also refused to sign proved only to be a temporary embarrassment. It seems obvious that the agreement was deliberately designed to ensure the Yugoslavs would not sign. This was ensured by the provision of two clauses in the agreement; one calling for a referendum in Kosovo in three years and the other demanding access to all of Yugoslavia by NATO troops. As expected the Yugoslav government refused to accept these provisions and, as planned this enabled the bombing to take place. |
 |
 |
 |
In reality the anticipated “victory surge” of popular opinion in favour of president Clinton did not happen. His tarnished image was not improved by the NATO war. Nor was NATO’s credibility enhanced by the Kosovo intervention. That organizations desperate attempt on the eve of its 50th birthday to justify its continued existence after the end of the cold war has shattered its image. |

|
|
 |
 |
 |
NATO which was
dedicated to the peaceful resolution of international disputes
and sworn to uphold the UN charter, violated everything it had
stood for since its inception. In so doing it has lost forever
the moral high ground, which had been its underlying strength
and influence. |
 |
 |
 |
NATO
was after all, for the peoples of the free world much more
than just a military alliance. It stood for peace, democracy,
and the rule of law. Now, because of its illegal bombing of
Yugoslavia it has become a threatening and aggressive force
prepared to wage undeclared war on any state whose policies do
not conform with its idea of humanitarian justice. |
 |
 |
 |
NATO’s
role as the enforcer of the so-called new diplomacy has caused
irreparable damage to its image and reputation. As the bombing
campaign continued and the list of military targets
diminished, NATO bombers were forced to switch to civilian
installations with consequent loss of life. Some of the NATO
allies began to seriously question the purpose of the war and
the methodical destruction of a modern European state. Public
opinion in Germany, Italy, France and other NATO states began
to turn against the bombing. |
 |
 |
 |
The new diplomacy
does not subscribe to the concept of limited war. Unlike the
days of the British Empire when the British were prepared to
accept casualties among their troops as the inevitable price
of empire, the new diplomacy insists on total war but one
without suffering casualties. The war is to be total and
antiseptic. The destruction of a country and its people is
preferable to the loss of one NATO soldier. But not all of the
NATO countries were willing to accept this novel approach to
international police enforcement. |
 |
 |
 |
As enthusiasm for the bombing waned, it became obvious to the NATO leaders that a negotiated settlement was essential. The problem was how to extricate themselves without losing face. ironically, they turned to the Russians. After discussions with president Milosevic, the Russian negotiator, Victor Chernomydrin, successfully convinced NATO leaders to drop the two conditions contained in the Rambouillet agreement which the Yugoslav government had refused to accept during the first attempt at resolving the dispute peacefully. |

|
|
 |
 |
 |
These conditions,
as indicated before, were the insistence on a referendum in
Kosovo in three years and access to all of Yugoslavia by NATO
forces. The two key clauses of the infamous Rambouillet
agreement, which had caused the war, in the first place were
readily dropped by NATO when it was realized the bombing
campaign was not working. |
|
 |
|
Further
concessions made by NATO stipulated that Yugoslavian
sovereignty over Kosovo was to be acknowledged and Kosovo was
to be occupied and managed under United Nations authority. It
remains to be seen if these conditions will be honoured. The
first few months experience in Kosovo does not augur well for
the continued sovereign control of Kosovo by Serbia. |
 |
 |
 |
The
fact remains, however, that NATO was forced in its desperation
to end the illegal bombing to rely on the two entities it was
at the outset determined to keep out of the Kosovo affair;
namely, the United Nations and Russia. |
 |
 |
 |
The long-term
implications of the NATO bombing are threatening and
far-reaching. The framework of world security, which served us
well since the end of the Second World War, has been
fractured. NATO has assumed the role of the United Nations but
it represents only nineteen western states. What about the
rest of the world? Moreover NATO’s promise to Russia that
its eastern expansion had only peaceful intentions now sounds
gratuitously hollow. Can NATO’s guarantee ever again be
trusted? NATO’s unnecessary war has returned us to the days
of the Cold War. Russia and China will begin to step up the
production of their nuclear arsenal. |
|
 |
 |
 |
|