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THE
LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE
(part 3) |
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In the case of Montenegro it shares the same language,
religion, history, culture and ethnicity as the Serbs.
There is not the slightest reason why this tiny country
of 600,000 inhabitants whose leader is alleged to be
involved in criminal activities should be granted
independence apart from the fact the President once
enjoyed the favor of the United States. |
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Yet according to a
report in the influential Herald Tribune the European Community
is suggesting that Montenegro can secede if fifty percent of the
eligible voters cast their ballots and if fifty five percent of
those choose independence. In effect this means that Montenegro
can attain independence with less than 30 percent of the voters
supporting it. Can anyone imagine that Javier Solana the EC
foreign Minister would advocate a similar deal being offered the
Basque separatists? |
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There are over three million
Hungarians living outside of Hungary in the neighboring
countries of Romania, Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine. Many of
these would like once again be governed by Hungary. Already
there has been a resurgence of Hungarian nationalism in the
Serbian province of Vojvodina. This is not surprising, if Kosovo
warrants independence why not Vojvodina? The Serbs and Croats in
Bosnia - Herzegovina despite every encouragement from Paddy
Ashdown the UN High Representative are not yet resolved to the
idea that this artificially created Protectorate is viable. Many
among them would favor joining their fellow countrymen in Serbia
or Croatia and independence for Kosovo will add strength to
these desires. |
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Among the conditions
laid down by the Contact Group and supported by the European
Council for any decision about Kosovo is that there is to be no
change in current borders, no union with another country or part
of another country and that Kosovo must not constitute a
military threat to its neighbors. These conditions are of course
as a result of legitimate concerns that an independent Kosovo
might well be the first step in the realization of the dream of
a greater Albania in the Balkans. No change in borders means no
joining up with Albania and no linking up with the Albanians in
southern Serbia or Macedonia. There are solid reasons for theses
concerns. The military incursions of the KLA into southern
Serbia and Macedonia in 2001 provided strong evidence that an
independent Kosovo could well lead to irredentist ideas among
the Albanian populations in the Balkan states. |
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Conditions laid down
during talks on the status of Kosovo are one thing but the
enforcement of such conditions after a decision has been made is
another. Under the watch full eyes of thousands of NATO and
United Nations troops the Albanians in Kosovo have since the
withdrawal of Serbian forces acted in a barbarous fashion
towards the non-Albanian population, have carried on with drug
smuggling and other criminal activities and have conducted
military operations across their borders. Is there any doubt
that should Kosovo achieve independence these activities will be
even more difficult to control? The borders between Albania and
Macedonia already, in effect, are open borders and are likely to
become invisible after independence. |
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Another serious implication of an
independent Kosovo relates to the possibility that the new
entity could become a haven for Islamist extremists. There have
already been concerns expressed by Western security experts
about the infiltration of Islamist extremists in Bosnia many of
whom remained there after the end of hostilities. There have
also been reports of mujahideen fighters supporting the KLA
against Serbian security forces and that al Qaeda has
established bases in Kosovo and Albania. Whatever the truth of
these reports it is reasonable to suppose that an independent
Kosovo would be ideally suitable for the establishment of al
Qaeda operations and a fertile ground for Islamist extremism. |
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The United States and the
EC have expressed concern about the danger to
international security caused by the existence of so
called "failed states." Failed states are defined as
those countries whose governments have weakened to the
point where they that they can no longer provide
adequate public services, physical security or economic
livelihood to their inhabitants. They become attractive
to terrorist organizations as safe havens and as staging
grounds for attacks on other targets. |
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The United States National
Security Strategy emphasizes the problem by declaring:
"America
is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by
failing ones, poverty, weak institutions and corruption can make
weak states vulnerable to terrorist net works." If, as it seems
evident, Kosovo meets all of the characteristics of a failed
state the determined rush of the United States and the European
Community to grant it independence will prove to be a grave
policy error and will inevitably have a negative effect on
Balkan stability. |
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7. CONCLUSION
After the end of the
cold war and the emergence of the United States as the most
powerful military force the world has ever known there was a
brief period, as the twentieth century was drawing to an
end, to hope that the world would experience a
"Pax
Americana." A benevolent and democratic America in full
support of the ideals expressed in the United Nations
Charter would ensure peace and order throughout the world.
The threat of global extinction and the horrors of
widespread bloodshed and violence would be ended. |
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This dream was shattered by the
United States led bombing of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999
which was done in violation of the UN Charter and contrary to
international law Despite trying to justify the bombing as a
humanitarian intervention to stop alleged genocide and ethnic
cleansing in Kosovo it was apparent the real reason was to
demonstrate the value of NATO as an organization and of
continuing United States dominance in Europe. It was a critical
turning point because it signaled the willingness of the United
States to use military force to resolve international disputes
and to intervene wherever and whenever it so desired. |
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Subsequent events
have shown that the United States has not abandoned this policy.
The invasion of Iraq without United Nations authority is the
most striking example of the US determination to act
unilaterally. There will always be an attempt to gain support
for these actions either through the use of NATO or by
persuading the European Community or the newly emerging states
of Central and Eastern Europe to get on side. The reality is,
however, that the most powerful nation in the world is not
willing to abide by the norms of international law or to conform
to the principles laid down by the United Nations Charter. |
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United States
policy in the Balkans has been dysfunctional since March 1992
when their Ambassador, Warren Zimmerman, persuaded Izetbegovic
the Islamist leader of the Bosnian Muslims to withdraw his
signature to the Lisbon Agreement. This decision which led to US
acceptance of the results of an illegal referendum and
recognition of the first Muslim state in Europe triggered civil
war in Bosnia and led directly to the death and destruction that
followed. In the following years US decisions have proven to be
equally disastrous for the region.
The United States subversion of the Vance-Owen plan and the
following Vance-Stoltenberg agreement prolonged the war in
Bosnia unnecessarily. The violation of the United Nations arms
embargo and the decision to permit several thousand mujihadeen
fighters into Bosnia and to provide them with modern military
equipment was also a decision bound to have "blow back"
implications damaging not only to the region but also to the
ongoing US war against terrorism. |
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The decision of the United States
government to support the cause of the terrorist KLA in its
armed rebellion to secede from Yugoslavia is another example of
US policy making gone wrong. There is evidence that the KLA
military incursions into southern Serbia and later in Macedonia
were backed by American agents. Their current policy supporting
independence for Kosovo is but another chapter in an unfolding
series of strategic errors. More seriously it reveals an
indifference to the concept of sovereignty and of respect for
the rule of law that is not in keeping with the principles laid
down by the founding fathers of that great nation. |
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United States policy in the
Balkans has been characterized by cynicism, duplicity and short
term tactical gain. By backing Islamist aims in the region and
supporting terrorist groups in Kosovo there might be the
immediate advantage of establishing a large military base in
Kosovo or appeasing further Albanian demands by advocating
independence for Kosovo but in the long term it will backfire. |
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For centuries past
Serbia, as one of the largest country in the Balkans and
situated on the strategically important crossroads
between Europe and the Near-East, was proud of its well
earned reputation as the "guardian of the gate." A
democratic Serbia can be a powerful ally to democratic
and free countries everywhere. In these perilous days
when even the United States with all of its awesome
military might can be terribly damaged by a handful of
fanatical Islamist terrorists it would seem only prudent
and in the national interest of Americans and of
Europeans to reverse their ongoing policy of humiliating
this key Balkan nation and find a solution to the Kosovo
problem that falls short of independence. |
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