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8. KOSOVO |
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Given the experience of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia,
it is little wonder that the Albanians in Kosovo realized the most effective way to gain
independence was to take up arms and resort to violence. This had been the formula for
success before and there was every reason to expect it would work again. Indeed, given the
successful public relations campaign that had been waged against President Milosovic and
the Serbs, and the record of human rights violations in Kosovo, it was inevitable that
Kosovo would be the next part of Yugoslavia to break away. |
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As the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA) escalated its armed attacks on Serbian police stations and stepped up its
assassinations of Serbian politicians and Serbian sympathizers among the Albanian
population, it could count on Serbian security forces to retaliate with ruthless
anti-insurgency tactics. The KLA could also count on the western media to give full
coverage to these heavy-handed measures. By October 1998, the fighting in Kosovo had
escalated to the point where the United Nations felt obliged to intervene |
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A United Nations Security
Council Resolution called for an end to the fighting, a withdrawal of the Yugoslav army to
barracks and the introduction of OSCE observers into Kosovo as monitors on the ground to
ensure that both parties kept the peace. Initially the army and security forces complied
with the UN Resolution, but the KLA did not stop its campaign of terror and the army once
again reacted with force. Villages suspected of harbouring KLA activists were burned and
their inhabitants dispersed. Many innocent people lost their lives. |
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Unable to stop the violence the United States and the
European community decided to intervene. The instrument of their intervention was to be
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). |
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