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 James Baker |
| 5. SLOVENIAN INDEPENDENCE |
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| When in June of 1991, it appeared possible that Slovenia
might in fact declare independence, the United States Secretary of State, James Baker,
flew to Belgrade and in a one day marathon session met with all of the leaders of the six
Republics. He warned them again that Yugoslavia must stay together and remain united. The
last person he met with that day was Ante Markovic, the Federal Prime Minister. |
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| Baker told the Prime Minister
(who was a Croatian) that if the Slovenes took overt action to secede from Yugoslavia, the
United States would not object if the Federal army was called in to preserve the unity of
Yugoslavia. Within a matter of days the Slovenes seized by force the Federal customs posts
along the Italian and Austrian borders. Markovic, the Prime Minister, ordered the Federal
army into Slovenia. |
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| Most observers did not expect
the Slovenes to resist against the powerful Yugoslav army (JNA), but contrary to all
expectations the Slovenes did resist. Armed with German supplied hand held antitank
missiles the Slovenes destroyed a number of tanks and in order to avoid further bloodshed,
Markovic ordered the army to withdraw. Thirty-seven JNA soldiers were killed in the brief
encounter and twelve Slovene Territorial Defense members lost their lives. |
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| The media coverage of the "Slovene war "
played a major role in shaping subsequent public opinion in the west .The Federal forces
were from the outset described as the" Serb-dominated" Yugoslav army, and
western media soon depicted the struggle as one of David and Goliath, with the JNA playing
the role of the giant Goliath. Thus from the very beginning of the Yugoslav conflict the
Serbs were branded as the bad guys even though most of the JNA troops were conscripts from
Kosovo or Macedonia. |
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| The Federal armed forces withdrew into
Croatia and soon after fighting broke out between JNA troops and Croatian paramilitary
groups. The dismemberment of Yugoslavia had begun. |
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| The "Slovene War"
marked a turning point in the attitude adopted by western governments towards the possible
disintegration of Yugoslavia. Prior to the Slovene unilateral action, the European Union
and the United States were in agreement that the nation must remain united. This policy
soon changed and it became evident that Germany and Austria were pressing for the
recognition of Slovene and Croatian independence. It is now known that as early as 1990
Croatian and Slovene leaders held meetings with senior politicians from both of these
countries urging support for independence. During this time the Vatican was openly
lobbying for independence and had particular influence on German politicians in Bavaria. |
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